The Shado-Pan order is a Pandaren warrior faction in World of Warcraft added in the Mists of Pandaria expansion. On the shoulders of the Shado-pan lies an important task: the protection of Pandaria from the evil Sha who escaped from captivity. Members of the faction can be identified by their distinctive red and blue armor and can be found on the border of Kun-Lai Summit and Townlong Steppes. Upon reaching a certain level of reputation, players will be able to purchase epic armor and some fun items from the Shado-pan Quartermaster.
Important: in order to improve relations with the Shado-Pan faction, you must have level 90 and completed the Heavenly Quest (Alliance, Horde) quest, which requires a reputation of at least Revered with the Golden Lotus.
There are daily quests available to players that can be picked up at the Shado-Pan Garrison in Townlong Steppes. These quests will take you to one of three possible zones, where you will first need to complete 4 easy quests, and then kill an elite monster in the final quest.
Every day you can choose a companion who will help you complete tasks. Some companions will be available immediately; to open access to others, you will have to defeat them in battle in the Shado-Pan garrison.
In terms of gaining reputation - you will receive +250 reputation for each daily quest (thus +1250 reputation per day). If you also complete the "trial" quest, you'll get another +350 reputation.
Upon reaching Exalted with the faction, a small quest chain will open up for you, which will summarize your adventures with the Shado-Pan and reward you with a mounted serpent.
Daily quests
Every day, 1 of 3 possible sets of tasks will be available to you. Each set will send you to a specific location in Townlong Steppes. Companion types:
In all cases, you will need to complete 4 tasks (you can turn them in to the companion who accompanies you) before you get the final quest.
Heroes of the Shado-Pan
Each time you can choose one of the heroes who will help you complete the tasks. He will fight on your side, take the attacks of monsters on himself and generally simplify the completion of quests. You can choose one of the following 9 NPCs:
Not all heroes are available on the same day, it depends on the set of tasks that is offered that day. 3 NPCs are available immediately, to open the rest, you need to complete the task, which becomes available at the Respect (+3 heroes) and Revered (+3 heroes) reputation levels.
| NPS | Dayliki | Reputation | Exercise |
| Fei Li | mages | friendliness | |
| snow flower | mages | respect | snow flower |
| Yalia the Wise Whisper | mages | reverence | Wise whisper |
| Defender I | guards | friendliness | |
| Chao Vociferous | guards | respect | Chao Vociferous |
| steel belly | guards | reverence | steel belly |
| Taoshi | the killers | friendliness | |
| Nurong | the killers | respect | Nurong |
| Shadow and red smoke | the killers | reverence | Red Smoke |
Companions will help you with various abilities. One is like an ice mage - they use spells and can slow down enemies, others are like tanks - they collect monsters on themselves, and others will give you stealth.
The third set of quests is started by Ling Six of Poole in the Shado-pan Garrison. You will be sent to the island of Shra'vess, where you will need to fight the praying mantises.
You will receive the following tasks:
Final chain
When your reputation with the Shado-pan reaches Exalted, Master Snowdrift will offer you the Mogu Raids quest, and upon completion, you will receive the quest Surprise Attack! The reward for this quest is the mount - Reins of the Onyx Cloud Serpent.
You will probably need the Cloud Serpent Riding skill to get these quests.
Once you reach Exalted with the Shadopan and complete the above two quests, you will automatically earn the Guardian of the Gods and Shado Master achievements (the second one also earns you the Shado Master title). In addition, you can get the Trusted Friends achievement by completing daily quests with various companions.
Below will be explained how to get the remaining 5 achievements.
Know your place
To get the Know Your Place achievement, players must complete all of the Shado-pan Black Guard missions without taking damage from monsters. "No damage" means "no hit" - that is, if you are under protective effects, but the monster hits you - the achievement will fail.
Secondly, it is very convenient to do this achievement together with a friend: while you are standing aside, he does all the work for you. But be careful: you must not be in a group, otherwise damage to one of you will ruin the achievement for both.
Otherwise (without friends) you have to rely on your companion.
Fire on the yaungols
To unlock the Yaungol Fire achievement, you need to kill 15 troopers at the same time during the Enemy of My Enemy... My Enemy Anyway! For this quest, you need to kill Mantises or Yaungols with Explosive Yaungol Oil, which can be found locally.
To do this, wait for the moment when two large groups of praying mantises and yaungols come together in battle and use explosives.
The gigantic combat experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War served as the basis for a radical improvement in the training of infantry, including for mountain rifle troops. The high maneuverability of troops, the continuously increasing depth of modern defense, the development and strengthening of the security service and camouflage techniques on the battlefield - all this placed increased demands on mountain rifle troops.
Surprise, an unexpected attack on the enemy has always been considered a prerequisite for success. The correctness of this position was also confirmed by all the experience of the Great Patriotic War. This experience teaches that surprise actions were more often successful for those units and subunits of the Red Army that stood out for their excellent combat skills and were led by initiative officers. They fought in accordance with the situation, taking into account the weaknesses and strengths of the enemy, used tactics unexpected for the enemy, beat him not with numbers, but with skill. Therefore, in order to transfer combat experience, already in the summer of 1945, at a meeting in the Main Directorate of Combat Training (GUBP) of the Red Army Ground Forces, a detailed discussion of all issues of training mountain rifle troops took place.
Reports were made by a number of officers of the mountain rifle troops, including Guards Colonel P. Grigorenko. Many people remember his performance. The officer spoke about the operation carried out at the very end of the war.
Terrain and party grouping
In the first half of February 1945, in preparation for the Moravian-Ostrava offensive operation, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General A. Bondarev replaced neighboring military units with its right flank. The area where the change of parts took place was a particularly difficult forested and rocky mountains. Only in the center of the site, in the area of the upper reaches of the rivers Charny Dunaets and Orava, there was a large lowland about 30 by 15 kilometers in size. Several roads converged in it, as a result of which it acquired important tactical significance for both sides: the one who owned these roads inevitably split the opposing grouping of troops into two parts isolated from one another.
The defense of the enemy, who occupied the lowland, was continuous and relatively dense. Its reserves were evenly distributed among the main communications nodes.
Taking into account the properties of the terrain, its low passability, the commander of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, Lieutenant General A. Bondarev, placed a small cover in the lowland, opposite the German defense. He concentrated the main forces of the corps northwest of the Charny Dunaets River, where the troops were preparing for the upcoming battles.
At dawn on February 23, the enemy launched an attack on the village of Vitanov. The attack, apparently designed for surprise, began without artillery preparation. The village of Vitanov, which was held by only a small unit, had to be abandoned. Subsequently, having suffered significant losses from machine gun fire located in camouflaged positions east of Vitanovy, the Germans stopped advancing. By this time, General Bondarev had decided to strike at the enemy in the direction of Bobrov with the task of attracting as many enemy forces as possible here and thereby assisting our troops, who were preparing an offensive in the neighboring sector.
The German attack on Vitanova was used as a pretext for a false regrouping of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. Its commander, allegedly worried about this attack, during the day of February 23 defiantly transferred his reserves from the area northwest of Czarny Dunajec to the Chocholow, Gladovka area. The demonstrative regrouping was carried out by one rifle regiment of a rifle division, reinforced by an artillery battalion. The same regiment later demonstrated the preparation of a counterattack from the Gladovka region in the direction of Vitanov-Trsten. At the same time, measures were taken to hide the actual areas where our troops were located and the preparations that had begun for the offensive of the main forces of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps in the Bobrovsky direction. All roads and settlements were heavily guarded. The movement of military units, subunits and transport in the area of concentration was carried out only at night. During the day, traffic was allowed along the Czarny Dunajec - Chocholuv road and in the Chocholuw - Gladovka area. For reference
intelligence officers in the Bobrovsky direction were allowed to exit only small reconnaissance groups. They advanced to specially prepared observation posts, which had hidden approach routes and were themselves well camouflaged.
The artillery carried out sighting for several days, and in the Trsten direction, in order to attract the attention of the enemy there, the artillerymen acted more actively than in the direction of the planned main attack.
The plan for bringing the tasks to the performers was drawn up so that the platoon commanders received them a few hours before the start of the offensive. The rest of the personnel were assigned a combat mission in the area of the starting position for the offensive immediately before advancing to the line of attack. Combat missions were communicated to the performers orally, and their assimilation was checked on a map, a box of sand, and from observation posts. Any talk about the upcoming offensive was strictly forbidden.
The exit of the units to their initial position for the offensive was carried out at night a day before the start of the attack, in small groups, along several previously reconnoitered roads and paths; at the same time, the personnel were not informed about where and for what purpose the units were moving.
The signal for attack was not set; the attack was to begin at the agreed time, for which all the officers checked their watches with those of the senior commander. The headquarters calculated the time it took for each unit to advance to the line of attack. Accordingly, the time of the performance of each of them was planned.
For the covert exit of units to the line of attack, all personnel were dressed in white camouflage suits, and their weapons were wrapped in bandages. It was forbidden to make any noise while driving. Officers were allowed to give a command to open fire only after the start of a general attack. If the Germans were the first to start shelling when our troops advanced to the line of attack, it was not allowed to immediately respond to the enemy with fire. Under these conditions, the unit had to lie down and establish whether the enemy fire was caused by the fact that he discovered our fighters, or whether it was ordinary combing fire. In the first case, i.e., when the enemy discovered the unit, it was planned to resume movement only after the enemy ceased fire; in the second case, it was recommended to continue approaching by crawling one at a time, covertly. The opening of mass fire by our infantry was a signal for a powerful five-minute fire raid of all artillery and mortars on the second enemy trench both in the area of the main attack (Bobrovsky direction) and in the direction of Vitanov.
The implementation of all these measures affected the results of the actions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. On February 25, leaving military outposts in Vitanov, the enemy withdrew to the former line, more convenient for defense. Our units took advantage of this and again captured the village. The Germans, apparently assuming that an offensive by the main forces of the Soviet troops was being prepared here, on the night of February 27, they consolidated their battle formations in this direction by introducing fresh units into the first line of defense.
The deceptive actions taken by General Bondarev forced the enemy to regroup their forces in the Bobrovsky sector as well.
On the morning of March 6, it was discovered that the enemy had changed units in the Bobrovsky direction. The German 3rd Mountain Rifle Division, which was located here, was removed from the front line of defense and replaced by other units that were less combat-ready. These data finally determined the date of our offensive.
The night of March 7 turned out to be exceptionally rainy. In the afternoon, the sky was covered with thick clouds, and at about 4 o'clock in the morning a snowstorm began. All our units, not noticed by the enemy, by 6 hours 30 minutes reached the line of attack (50-80 meters from the first German trench), and one of the battalions (under the command of Major Zaitsev), successfully using the gap in the first line of trenches unoccupied by the Germans, silently overcame the barrier and accumulated to attack in front of the second trench.
At 7 o'clock, the Soviet infantry attacked the enemy and, after a short hand-to-hand fight, completely destroyed the Germans in the first trench. At the same time, the regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Zavalnyuk, taking advantage of the success of the battalion of Major Zaitsev, who by this time had broken through the second line of defense of the Germans, with a swift throw went behind enemy lines and saddled the road in the region of height 650. Having secured the height and ensured that it was occupied by our artillery, the regiment continued to advance along roads to Bobrov. The offensive in other areas (mainly due to the difficulty of moving through the mountains covered with deep snow) developed much more slowly. But the successful actions of the Zavalnyuk regiment allowed the rest of the units to complete the breakthrough of the defense. By the end of the day, the troops reached the nearest approaches to the settlements of Zubroglav, Bobrov, Gamri. The following days (from March 8 to March 11) were spent in the fight against continuous counterattacks of superior enemy forces.
During these battles, the scouts managed to establish that against the 10 rifle battalions of our rifle division, the Germans were forced to abandon 3 infantry divisions (up to 18 infantry battalions), supported by 15-20 tanks and self-propelled guns. This group of enemy troops was preparing to launch an offensive from the Bobrov region in the direction of Jablonka, Charny Dunaets to the rear of the main forces of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, which, according to the Germans, were to be located in the Khokholuv, Gladovka region. In addition, the Germans attracted up to 4 infantry battalions from neighboring sectors that were not attacked by units of the 17th Corps.
Thus, having almost a triple superiority in infantry (the German battalions were much larger than ours), some superiority in artillery, having tanks and self-propelled guns, the enemy was defeated in a defensive battle.
Our units, despite some losses, fully retained their combat capability. However, an offensive in the former direction, in the absence of our superiority in forces and means, could hardly promise success. Therefore, it was necessary to take advantage of the moral decline of the enemy as soon as possible. To do this, it was necessary to choose a new direction for delivering a powerful and sudden blow that would complete the rout of the opposing German grouping.
Preparation of an offensive in the Trsten direction
For a new blow, the Trsten direction was chosen. The basis of the senior commander's plan remained the same: a demonstration of the concentration of the main grouping in one (this time, Bobrovsky) direction and careful secrecy in preparing an offensive in another (Trsten) direction. The implementation of this plan began even during the period of enemy counterattacks. Already on March 10 and 11, 1945, part of the forces were withdrawn from the Trsten direction and transferred to the Bobrov direction. Subsequently, these troops went on the defensive here, replacing the main forces of the shock group, which were transferred to the Trsten direction in compliance with the strictest camouflage measures. To demonstrate a false concentration, a rifle regiment was left, which at the same time was a reserve of the Bobrovsky section. In the covert preparation of the strike in the Trsten direction, the main attention was paid to using the positive experience gained in previous battles. To demonstrate a false concentration, the same regiment was allocated, which in the past successfully coped with this task in the Chocholow, Gladovka region. Detailed analyzes of the past offensive were carried out with commanders of all levels.
At this stage of the fighting, the actions of the rifle division of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps deserve the greatest interest. It advanced on a secondary direction in the strip: the railway, the Chochołów-Trstena highway, and one of its regiments, reinforced by an artillery-machine-gun battalion and an artillery division, in the strip of the Jablonka-Chyzhne highway.
Having received the task and assessing the situation, the division commander came to the following conclusions. It will not be difficult for the division to succeed in the direction of its main attack, since here the enemy had only one infantry battalion (1st battalion of the 575th infantry regiment). But the success of the regiment advancing on Khyzhna is very doubtful, since the entire German 573rd Infantry Regiment was against it, occupying an advantageous and pre-prepared line of defense.
If the regiment advancing on Khyzhna fails, then the enemy, leaving a small cover against him, can throw his entire 573rd regiment into the flank of the division, and possibly reinforce it by transferring reserves from the Bobrovsky sector.
In the event that the enemy's counterattacks to the flank are combined with the strike of reserves from Trsten, heavy and hopeless defensive battles await the division.
Consequently, it was necessary to prepare and organize the offensive of the right-flank regiment in such a way as not to allow the enemy to maneuver reserves.
Proceeding from these considerations, the division commander paid the main attention to the preparation of the strike by the right-flank regiment. The organization of the offensive began with the study of the terrain and the location of the enemy. From conversations with officers and soldiers who took part in previous battles for Khyzhne, as well as from military observation data and by interviewing local residents, it was found that:
- the ability to maneuver in the Khyzhne direction is limited on the right by the Charna Orava River, which has a width of 50-60 m, high steep banks, a fast current and depth that excludes wading, and on the left - by a dense forest through which only single people can move, and then in dry time of the year;
- the area between the river Charna Orava and the forest is completely open, the relief is slightly wavy with a gradual increase in the direction of the enemy; consequently, Khyzhne can be observed only from the Vitanov area and from the area of the Yablonka-Bobrov highway, while the enemy can observe all the movements of our troops in this sector;
- the front line of defense of the Germans runs along the northeastern outskirts of the village, and the line of combat guards is 350-400 meters east of the village, located on the highest ridge of the area;
- in previous battles, the Germans, passing our infantry through the line of their outposts, suddenly opened strong rifle and machine-gun fire.
It is clear that these data were far from enough to make a decision to fight. Additional data on the enemy's defense could be obtained in two ways: firstly, by organizing observation to study the forward edge, and secondly, by operating in small search parties.
The view from the existing observation posts was very limited, in particular, the eastern part of the village of Khyzhne was poorly visible.
In order for the observation to provide more accurate data, it was decided to bring the observers closer to the front line of the enemy's defense, that is, to go to the western edge of the forest. On March 20, the division commander with a group of officers, after preliminary engineering and military reconnaissance, went to this edge. The enemy defense line looked from here as shown in Figure 1.
The village was not at all as lifeless as it seemed from the previous observation posts. A significant group of German troops was located in the grove. The most unexpected thing was that the leading edge of the German defense did not stretch along the outskirts of the village, as previously assumed, but 150-200 meters ahead of it. Here one could see a continuous trench equipped with dugouts, separate bunkers and communication passages laid in the direction of the village.
Further observation established that the trench was saturated with guns and machine guns and a very small number of infantry; the approaches to it are covered with barriers, and in addition, on the outskirts of Khyzhne and on the eastern edge of the grove, there is one strong point each, the gap between them is covered with minefields in depth and wire obstacles.
Based on these data, the commander of the rifle division made the following decision: to capture strongholds on the eastern outskirts of the village of Khyzhne and on the edge of the grove with an unexpected blow, and then, advancing along the village and along the grove, defeat the enemy in this area.
The originality of this simple decision lay in the fact that with the capture of strongholds, the Germans were deprived of all the advantages that they received due to natural and climatic conditions. In the future, the battle was to unfold on the ground, not prepared for defense. Simultaneously with the battle for the front line, the enemy's reserve, located in the grove, was fettered.
The details of the decision of the commander of the rifle division are visible from scheme 2. The main forces of the regiment with a machine gun company of the artillery and machine gun battalion of the fortified area were to seize a strong point on the eastern outskirts of Khyzhne with a surprise attack.
The detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Shcherbakov, consisting of two machine-gun companies and an artillery battalion, was to take advantage of the first success of the regiment, advance to firing positions in the area of \u200b\u200bthe enemy’s outposts, occupying the area from the forest to the highway inclusive, push all machine guns, artillery here and further support the offensive by all means regiment along the village of Khyzhne.
The attack on the stronghold on the eastern edge of the grove was assigned to one of the companies, reinforced by a machine-gun company, previously located in the same direction. One rifle battalion, simultaneously with the attack of both strongholds, was to overcome the minefield in the gap between them, go to the grove from the north and, having received a machine-gun company at its disposal, advance along the grove in readiness to deliver a fire strike in case of enemy counterattacks.
The main difficulty in the implementation of this plan was the exit of the regiment to its original position, since most of the path passed through unsteady soil and people fell chest-deep into icy water. Despite all the difficulties, the regiment passed this way at night in absolute silence.
The course of hostilities
At 6 am on March 28, 1945, the regiment went on the offensive. The weather was not favorable, but in spite of this, complete surprise was achieved.
The most successful began operations on the left flank. The company managed to make a silent passage through the minefields. The fighters rapidly attacked the stronghold and, in a fifteen-minute hand-to-hand fight, destroyed and partially captured its entire garrison, captured trenches, 2 bunkers, 4 dugouts and a footbridge across the Elesna Voda River.
The battalion, which attacked a stronghold on the eastern outskirts of Khyzhne, began its operations less successfully. Here, the passage in the minefields was not thoroughly cleared, and when the infantry moved to attack, one mine-rocket was blown up, thereby warning the German garrison of the stronghold. However, the battalion attacked the enemy and captured the stronghold.
By the same time, the 2nd battalion, having successfully overcome the barrier zone and not meeting resistance, went to the grove, where it joined up with a company operating independently. She fought with the infantry of the enemy who went over to the counterattack. With the approach of the battalion, the enemy counterattack was repulsed.
As it turned out later from the documents captured from the enemy, the commander of the 320th Infantry Division of the Germans, in the course of hostilities, having concluded that our main attack was directed at Khyzhna, asked for support from the neighboring (Bobrovsky) sector and ordered the commander of the 573rd Infantry Regiment to unite all their troops not connected by battle with the reserves that approached, and then restore their original position with a powerful counterattack on Khyzhna.
Our troops by this time occupied the following position.
The detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Shcherbakov, having reached the line of military outposts of the Germans, advanced all machine guns and artillery to the ridge of the heights for direct fire, set up observation posts and took Khyzhne and the entire area in front of the village under destructive fire. Part of the right-flank machine-gun company from this detachment, skillfully using the terrain, penetrated into the village, took possession of several houses near the highway and entrenched in them, controlling the street of the village and the road with their fire.
In this situation, a decisive counterattack of the enemy began on the entire front of the regiment. The German command took all measures to stop the advance of the Soviet troops from the village along the highway. Part of the forces from the grove was transferred here by the enemy, as well as rear units and a sapper company.
Our offensive was temporarily suspended and resumed only in the evening. By morning, the highway from Hyzhne to Trsten was free, and not a single enemy soldier managed to retreat to Trsten. Developing the offensive along the highway and to the west of it, the regiment threw back the remnants of the enemy to the villages of Osada and Ustye. Subsequently, he captured these villages with a swift attack and, thereby splitting the enemy’s front, isolated his northern group of troops from the southern one.
Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn: fighting in the mountains requires high activity from the troops, and the superiority of the enemy in forces should not reduce it. The analyzed example is the best illustration of this.
In any battle, and even more so in the mountains, one must strive for surprise. The most important conditions for achieving surprise are stealth and speed of regrouping.
Careful disguise of one's intention and disinformation of the enemy are of great importance. Demonstration of false actions must be carried out in such a way that they seem expedient to the enemy. In the above examples, the expediency of false regroupings was quite clear to the enemy, since they were, as it were, a reaction to the threat created by the enemy.
All officers should strive for surprise, because it, repeatedly repeated (in various forms) in the same battle, can lead to brilliant results.
Careful preparation of an unexpected strike, the use of unfavorable meteorological conditions, even with the simplest plan (frontal attack), can ensure surprise and success. The offensive on March 7-11, 1945 of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps during the Moravian-Ostrava offensive operation fully confirms this.
As a result of all these actions, the superior enemy forces were completely defeated.
- this is a very important point, then we will consider it from another angle - from an angle called surprise attack. To do this, we will use the help of Lyalko V.V. and his book A Treatise on Women's Self-Defense.
Surprise attack in this passage is considered from the point of view of self-defense. However, without a doubt, the listed rules can be used by everyone. The main thing is not to forget about the need for realistic training in surprise attacks. So let's get started:
Half the secret to winning a street fight is surprise attack.
You all know about the surprise toy. Such a beautiful box. You press the button, and from there suddenly jumps out a devil on a spring! Yes, even with a heartbreaking cry. Naturally, the one who opened it is frightened by surprise.
So you should be with the same secret as this box. Calm, or even "frightened" outwardly, but internally ready to strike at any second, rush forward, scream! Never wait for the enemy to attack!
By the way, in medieval Europe (approximately in the XIV-XVI centuries), hand-to-hand fights between people were a kind of trial. In the event that a fight was coming between a man and a woman (for example, during a divorce), the man, as the stronger one, was immersed in a hole to the waist, depriving him of the opportunity to be the first to rush to his wife. Becoming a meter lower, the man had to reflect the attacks of the woman in this position. The victory of one of the parties was seen as "God's judgment."
Therefore, the Lord God himself commands you to attack first - when the enemy turned away, leaned over, stood sideways or back, closed his eyes, sat down, lights a cigarette, etc. But even if he is facing you, then all the same, an unexpected attack with a wild scream psychologically gives the result no less than if he was in a hole up to his waist!
Birds of prey attack, gliding silently from the direction of the sun, or fall on the victim with their wings folded like a stone. An attacking predatory beast always spreads along the ground, camouflaged by vegetation, and attacks silently. He growls only to intimidate the victim or direct it towards the ambush of his companions.
A smart woman will always be able, before delivering a fatal blow, to lull the enemy's vigilance with her outwardly harmless appearance. You can’t frown, clench your fists, bare your teeth, etc. You can smile, you can make an “icy” expression on your face, you can portray fear, you can babble some wild nonsense - everything is fine.
When dismantling, robbing and in a banal street fight, no matter how quietly he behaves, a man usually tries to hit his head harder, often with some kind of piece of iron, so that he loses consciousness. And then they also kick the recumbent, to ensure that he does not get up in the next few minutes.
In this regard, an important advantage of a woman is that they usually do not perceive her as a dangerous opponent, do not expect serious resistance from her, and therefore do not seek to put her out of action in advance. As a rule, a lady is intimidated with verbal threats, grabbed by her hands, hair, clothes, or raked in an armful, without caring about her own safety.
Only do not try to get into combat stances karate, boxing, wushu or judo. If a woman infuriates the attackers with such antics, she can be perceived as a man, which means they will start beating for real. No, you need to attack suddenly, not getting into any special stance for this, but from the position in which you are.
By the way, an important advantage weapons, carried with you, is that it can be discreetly prepared for use and suddenly applied. And use it skillfully, since it is with this weapon that you have learned how to handle it. Improvised items for self-defense as weapons also play an important role in your salvation.
Always remember that your opponent is by no means a cyborg terminator made of steel and heavy-duty plastic, controlled by a perfect computer. He is just an ordinary human being who can easily be tricked, scared, maimed and even killed with his bare hands. When I look at other murderers and rapists during their trial, I simply marvel: how could such an unfinished morel rape, stab, cripple someone? The answer, apparently, is one: his victim was shaking with horror, instead of making this bastard shake.
Under no circumstances do not insult the enemy personally and his other relatives, even if he is three times a bum and a vagabond in appearance. You will not intimidate anyone with your miserable vocabulary, just add gunpowder to the fire. A scandal is brewing, insults are flying (a whore, a creature, a bitch, etc.), they are spitting right in your face, trying to hurt you as much as possible - remain unperturbed.
A person can be offended only if he himself is offended. The wise Chinese believe that it is not worth getting into a squabble. If you're walking past a fence and there's an angry dog raging, you don't get on all fours and bark back, do you? And if a crow drops its droppings on you, you don’t throw the same thing back. You will say: "But these are animals." But who can tell where the animal ends and the human begins?
Know: as long as you are silent and in control of yourself - you are a man!
Of course, it is very unpleasant if you are insulted, called a whore or a creature. Do you want to punish for the "bazaar"? Brutally deceive the enemy. How? To do this, there are special psychological tricks, there are such things as deception and provocation. Remember that it is more profitable to use a sharp tongue not for cursing, but for deceiving the enemy.
In this way,
What conclusions can be drawn from this passage? Very simple. The surprise of the attack is achieved:
So how do you train for a good surprise attack? You can train to attack the enemy from the back - but it is quite difficult to make him turn his back on you. In addition, the ways in which the enemy will turn his back on you (or close his eyes) for the most part belong to the second point - when the attention of the enemy is artificially transferred to the area you need. The simplest example of an opponent closing their eyes is the use of weapons such as .
The second method is the most difficult to train, but the most effective when used. Since suddenly attacking an opponent whose attention is really distracted is much better than the third method.
The third method is not suitable for everyone. Because it is quite difficult to develop such speed, strength and form of attack that the enemy does NOT expect. And this will take years. Although, whoever likes it. In addition, the combination of all three methods gives a greater effect than each of the methods separately.
